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comparative analysis of line lists of human cases
infected with influenza A(H7N9) in China
Eric HY Lau1†, Jiandong Zheng2†, Tim K Tsang1, Qiaohong Liao2, Bryan Lewis3, John S Brownstein4,5, Sharon Sanders6,
Jessica Y Wong1, Sumiko R Mekaru4, Caitlin Rivers3, Peng Wu1, Hui Jiang2, Yu Li2, Jianxing Yu2, Qian Zhang2,
Zhaorui Chang2, Fengfeng Liu2, Zhibin Peng2, Gabriel M Leung1, Luzhao Feng2, Benjamin J Cowling1*
and Hongjie Yu2*Abstract
Background: Appropriate public health responses to infectious disease threats should be based on best-available
evidence, which requires timely reliable data for appropriate analysis. During the early stages of epidemics, analysis
of ‘line lists’ with detailed information on laboratory-confirmed cases can provide important insights into the
epidemiology of a specific disease. The objective of the present study was to investigate the extent to which
reliable epidemiologic inferences could be made from publicly-available epidemiologic data of human infection
with influenza A(H7N9) virus.
Methods: We collated and compared six different line lists of laboratory-confirmed human cases of influenza
A(H7N9) virus infection in the 2013 outbreak in China, including the official line list constructed by the Chinese
Center for Disease Control and Prevention plus five other line lists by HealthMap, Virginia Tech, Bloomberg
News, the University of Hong Kong and FluTrackers, based on publicly-available information. We characterized
clinical severity and transmissibility of the outbreak, using line lists available at specific dates to estimate epidemiologic
parameters, to replicate real-time inferences on the hospitalization fatality risk, and the impact of live poultry market
closure.
Results: Demographic information was mostly complete (less than 10% missing for all variables) in different line lists,
but there were more missing data on dates of hospitalization, discharge and health status (more than 10% missing for
each variable). The estimated onset to hospitalization distributions were similar (median ranged from 4.6 to 5.6 days)
for all line lists. Hospital fatality risk was consistently around 20% in the early phase of the epidemic for all line lists and
approached the final estimate of 35% afterwards for the official line list only. Most of the line lists estimated >90%
reduction in incidence rates after live poultry market closures in Shanghai, Nanjing and Hangzhou.
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Conclusions: We demonstrated that analysis of publicly-available data on H7N9 permitted reliable assessment of
transmissibility and geographical dispersion, while assessment of clinical severity was less straightforward. Our
results highlight the potential value in constructing a minimum dataset with standardized format and definition,
and regular updates of patient status. Such an approach could be particularly useful for diseases that spread
across multiple countries.
Keywords: Epidemiological monitoring, Line list, Infectious disease outbreak, Influenza A virus, H7N9 subtypeBackground
Emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases pose a
continuing threat to human health. In the past decade we
have faced global epidemics including SARS-coronavirus,
pandemic influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus, avian influenza
A(H5N1) virus, and most recently we have witnessed the
emergence of influenza A(H7N9) virus in China, and the
Middle-East-Respiratory-Syndrome (MERS)-coronavirus in
the Middle East and Europe. Appropriate public health
responses to infectious disease threats should be based
on the best-available evidence, which in turn requires
reliable data and appropriate analysis. In particular, risk
assessments for A(H7N9) and MERS-coronavirus involve
estimation and characterization of transmissibility and
clinical severity [1-3].
Provided incidence of laboratory-confirmed cases is
low, it is possible for health authorities to collect detailed
data on each confirmed case in a ‘line list’. Analysis of this
information can provide important insights into the epi-
demiology of a specific disease. A notable aspect of the re-
cent epidemics of A(H7N9) and MERS-coronavirus is the
amount of information about individual cases provided
online, through official press releases and various media
sources, to a much greater extent than, for example,
during the A(H1N1) pandemic in 2009 to 2010 and the
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome epidemic in 2003.
The influenza A(H7N9) virus emerged in early 2013 in
China, and 143 laboratory-confirmed cases had been re-
ported in mainland China by the end of 2013, with the
majority of confirmed cases having illness onset during
March and April 2013 [4]. The Chinese National Health
and Family Planning Commission notified the World
Health Organization in late March and joined forces for
the prevention and control of the disease, along with
other international animal health organizations [5]. Initia-
tives such as The Global Initiative on Sharing All Influ-
enza Data (GISAID) have provided a framework for the
sharing of full sequence data on virus genomes [6]. In the
A(H7N9) epidemic, GISAID fostered several studies in
early April, such as comparison of the A(H7N9) virus
against Eurasian avian influenza viruses [7] and avian in-
fluenza A(H7N7) in the Netherlands [8]. There is no simi-
lar framework for the sharing of epidemiological data,
although a number of unofficial line lists and repositoriesof epidemiologic data have been created based on publicly
available data by automated digital surveillance algorithms
or epidemiologists [9]. The objective of the present study
was to investigate the extent to which reliable epidemio-
logic inferences could be made based on publicly available
epidemiologic data, compared to the official data collected
by Chinese health authorities on laboratory-confirmed
cases of influenza A(H7N9) virus infection.
Methods
Ethical approval
It was determined by the Chinese National Health and
Family Planning Commission that the collection of data
from influenza A(H7N9) cases was part of a continuing
public health investigation of an emerging outbreak and
was exempt from institutional review board assessment.
Sources of data
A line list with detailed epidemiologic information on
each laboratory-confirmed case of influenza A(H7N9)
virus infection was constructed by the Chinese Center
for Disease Control and Prevention (China CDC). Case
definitions, surveillance for identification of A(H7N9)
cases and A(H7N9) laboratory assays are described in a
previous report [10]. Relevant epidemiological data on
A(H7N9) cases were collected through interviews by
trained staff. Data used in the present analyses include
age, sex, geographic location (city and province), health
status on admission, and dates of illness onset, hospital
admission, death or discharge, for cases which were offi-
cially announced as of 31 May 2013, when the epidemic
had stabilized.
In addition to the ‘official’ China CDC line list, we
collated five other line lists that were constructed based
on publicly available data. The five line lists were created
by Harvard Medical School/Boston Children’s Hospital
(‘HealthMap’), Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State
University (‘Virginia Tech’), Bloomberg News (‘Bloomberg’),
the University of Hong Kong School of Public Health
(‘HKUSPH’), and FluTrackers [see Additional file 1:
data file]. HealthMap is an automated disease surveillance
system specializing in real-time geospatial visualization of
disease outbreaks [11]. FluTrackers is an online forum
which tracks and hosts discussions of a wide range of
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Virginia Tech, and HKUSPH were staffed with a group of
epidemiologists with interest in the modeling of infectious
disease epidemics. Bloomberg news agency collated basic
epidemiological data to assist with monitoring of the out-
break. Each line list was compiled based on reports of
laboratory-confirmed influenza A(H7N9) cases released
by, in the order of importance, the national and provincial
Ministry of Health websites or microblogs, World Health
Organization, international online disease reporting sys-
tems and online Chinese news or blogs [see Additional
file 2: Table S1].
Statistical methods
We first conducted descriptive comparisons of the ac-
curacy of individual variables in each line list compared
to the China CDC version on various dates. Then we
used line lists available at specific dates to estimate key
epidemiologic parameters including the distributions of
time from illness onset to hospitalization delay, time
from illness onset to death, and time from onset to dis-
charge, without adjusting for right-censoring which would
require regular updates on patient status. Finally, we used
the line lists available at specific dates to replicate real-
time inferences on the hospitalization fatality risk (HFR)
and the impact of closure of live poultry markets. We ana-
lyzed the line lists starting from 10 April 2013, when the
number of confirmed A(H7N9) cases surpassed 30, until
31 May 2013. As the line lists were updated independently
at different dates, for comparison purpose the dates of
analyses were chosen to match the time of updates for
most line lists.
To study inferences on clinical severity, we estimated
the HFR [3] at specific calendar dates using two ap-
proaches. First, we divided the cumulative number of
deaths by the cumulative number of hospitalized cases
(HFR1), an approach which is certain to underestimate
the hospitalization fatality risk because unresolved
cases destined to die are included in the denominator
but not the numerator [13,14]. Second, we divided the
cumulative number of deaths by the cumulative num-
ber of cases who had either died or been discharged
(recovered). This approach (HFR2) should give an accurate
real-time estimate of the HFR if the distribution of times
from onset to death is similar to the distribution of times
from onset to discharge, and the HFR does not change
over calendar time [14].
To study inferences on transmissibility, we estimated
the impact of closure of live poultry markets in Shanghai,
Nanjing and Hangzhou using Poisson regression models
that compared the incidence rates of confirmed A(H7N9)
cases since the first case in each city versus the incidence
rates after closures [15,16]. We allowed for incubat-
ing infections by excluding a two-day ‘washout’ periodimmediately after market closures, with other washout pe-
riods considered in sensitivity analyses. We used multiple
imputation with 20 replications for missing dates of illness
onset in each dataset, based on the empirical onset to
reporting distribution [17,18]. All statistical analyses
were conducted using R version 3.0.1 (R Foundation
for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria).
Results
Age, sex, province and date of illness and death were
collected for each influenza A(H7N9) case in all six line
lists (Table 1). Current health status was also collected
but only the China CDC, Virginia Tech and FluTrackers
line lists had more detailed information on severity. Infor-
mation was updated daily for China CDC and HealthMap
while other line lists had more frequent updates at the be-
ginning of the epidemic and less frequent updates when
the epidemic tapered in early May. FluTrackers also up-
dated their line list daily but was able to retrieve historical
archives for the specific dates as listed in Table 1. More
than 90% of the cases could be matched to the China
CDC line lists by age, sex, province and date of illness on-
set [see Additional file 3: Figure S1]. While information on
age, sex and province were mostly complete in different
line lists, there were significant proportions of missing data
on dates of hospitalization, discharge and health status.
Death and discharge dates that were only available weeks
after illness onset had a greater proportion of missing in-
formation [see Additional file 3: Figure S2]. For matched
cases, we found discrepancies in dates of hospitalization,
death and discharge when comparing to the China CDC
line list [see Additional file 3: Figure S3].
We compared different epidemiological characteristics
inferred from different line lists over time, for all cases
irrespective of matching. The reported number of cases
from the five line lists followed closely those reported by
the China CDC line list, with less than one-day time-lag
(Figure 1). The epidemic curves from the HealthMap,
HKUSPH, Virginia Tech and FluTrackers line lists also
resembled that from the China CDC line list at different
time points [see Additional file 3: Figure S4], although
some of the onset dates were missing or inaccurate. We
estimated the onset to hospitalization distribution by a
Gamma distribution, and onset to death and discharge
distribution by Weibull distribution [4]. The estimated
onset to hospitalization distributions on 1 May 2013 were
generally similar (median ranged from 4.6 to 5.6 days) for
all line lists (Figure 1). HealthMap, HKUSPH and Virginia
Tech line lists were able to reflect the longer onset to
death period for patients staying longer in hospital [see
Additional file 3: Figure S5]. Information on discharge
dates was only available in the Bloomberg and HKUSPH
line lists, and in those datasets the estimated onset to
discharge distributions were much shorter than the
Table 1 Summary of epidemiological information collected in each line list
Information collected
for each case
China CDC HealthMap Virginia Tech Bloomberg HKU SPH FluTrackers
Age × × × × × ×
Sex × × × × × ×
Province × × × × × ×
City × × × ×
Date of illness onset × × × × × ×
Date of hospital admission × × × × ×
Date of discharge × × ×
Date of death × × × × × ×
Health status discharged/mild/
stable/severe/died
died discharged/mild/
stable/severe/died
discharged/died mild/severe/died discharged/mild/
stable/severe/died
Dates of data
updates/archives
Apr 5 - May 31 Apr 5 - May 31 Apr 22, 24, 25, 26,
29, May 1, 6, 7
Apr 5–11, 13–19,
22–26, 29, 30, May 2, 7
Apr 10–24, May
1, 6, 13, 20, 27
Apr 13, 15, 16, 18, 22,
23, 27, 28, 30, May
2, 6, 9, 17, 29, 31
China CDC, Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention; HKUSPH, The University of Hong Kong School of Public Health.
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Figure 1 Epidemiological distributions based on analysis of line lists on 1 May 2013. (A) Number of laboratory-confirmed cases of influenza
A(H7N9) virus infection, 10 April to 31 May, 2013. (B) onset-to-hospitalization distribution. (C) onset-to-death distribution. (D) onset-to-discharge
distribution. Date of analysis refers to US local time for HealthMap, Virginia Tech and FluTrackers line lists, and China local time for China CDC, Bloomberg
and HKUSPH line lists. China CDC, Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention; HKUSPH, the University of Hong Kong School of Public Health.
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missing discharge dates at the end of April [see Additional
file 3: Figures S2 and S5]. We were able to obtain robust
estimates for the onset to hospitalization distribution from
each of the line lists early in the epidemic, but robust esti-
mates of the onset to death distribution were not available
until early May [see Additional file 2: Table S2].
Figure 2 shows the estimated hospitalization fatality
risk under the two different approaches. HFR1 estimates
were consistently around 20% before May for all line
lists and approached 35% afterwards. The five line lists
consistently under-estimated HFR1 although the 95%
confidence intervals covered the true estimate. As of 31
May, there were 18 patients with unresolved outcomes,
including 16 patients with severe condition. The estimation
of HFR2 required more detailed information (discharge
status) and was only available for the China CDC and
Bloomberg line lists. HFR2 decreased over time and stabi-
lized at around 30% to 40% in early May. The Bloomberg
estimates tended to be higher than the China CDC HFR2
with increasingly larger discrepancies over time. Only theFigure 2 Estimated hospitalization fatality risks for laboratory-confirm
based on the number of deaths divided by the number of confirmed case
confirmed cases with known outcome (death or discharge). HealthMap, Vir
of discharged patients. The most updated estimate of the HFR [19] is show
Date of analysis refers to US local time for HealthMap, Virginia Tech and Flu
HKUSPH line lists. China CDC, Chinese Center for Disease Control and Preve
Kong School of Public Health.HealthMap and FluTrackers line lists were able to pro-
vide more robust estimates of the fatality risk for hospi-
talized cases near the end of the study [see Additional
file 2: Table S2].
The epidemic curves in Shanghai and Hangzhou
were very similar based on the China CDC, HealthMap,
Virginia Tech and FluTrackers line lists where information
on geographic location was available to the city level
(Figure 3), athough there were some missing onset dates
[see Additional file 3: Figure S2]. Live poultry market
closures were implemented on 6 April, 8 April and 15
April in Shanghai, Nanjing and Hangzhou, respectively.
Except for the FluTrackers line list where all onset dates
after April were not available in Nanjing, market clo-
sures in all three cities were consistently estimated to be
extremely effective in reducing A(H7N9) incidence rates
(Table 2).
Discussion
We examined which important epidemiological infer-
ences could be drawn from publicly available informationed Influenza A(H7N9) cases, 10 April to 31 May, 2013. (A) HFR1
s. (B) HFR2 based on the number of deaths divided by the number of
ginia Tech and HKUSPH did not routinely collect data on the number
n by the gray lines. Vertical lines indicate the 95% confidence intervals.
Trackers line lists, and China local time for China CDC, Bloomberg and
ntion; HFR, hospitalization fatality risk; HKUSPH, the University of Hong
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Figure 3 Dates of illness onset of influenza A(H7N9) cases in Shanghai, Nanjing and Hangzhou. Dotted lines show the dates of live poultry
market closure in each city. Patients with missing onset dates were excluded.
Lau et al. BMC Medicine 2014, 12:88 Page 6 of 9
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/12/88
Table 2 Estimated effect of live poultry market closure in
Shanghai, Nanjing and Hangzhou
Line list Estimated incidence rate ratio (P value)
Shanghai Nanjing Hangzhou
China CDC 0.064 (<0.001) 0.014 (0.007) 0.000 (<0.001b)
HealthMapa 0.067 (<0.001) 0.000 (0.034b) 0.007 (<0.001)
Virginia Techa 0.037 (<0.001) 0.017 (0.010b) 0.006 (<0.001)
FluTrackersa 0.061 (<0.001) 0.362 (0.328) 0.004 (<0.001)
aMissing onset dates were imputed based on the empirical onset-to-report
distribution from other A(H7N9) cases in Shanghai, Nanjing and Hangzhou.
bThere were no cases two days after the market closure in Nanjing and
Hangzhou. P values were based on likelihood ratio tests. China CDC, Chinese
Center for Disease Control and Prevention.
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strated that analyses mainly based on the reporting of A
(H7N9) cases, deaths or their demographics, such as
epidemic curves in different regions, estimated onset-
to-admission distributions, onset-to-death distributions
and impact of poultry market closure can very closely
match the results from official data sources with little
time-lag. However, estimates of the fatality risk for hospi-
talized cases were less reliable based on public informa-
tion, where the estimation requires follow-up of patient
status after hospitalization. For example, there was a ten-
dency for online news to highlight the first discharged
case in each province but there were fewer reports on sub-
sequent discharged cases. This is the first study to rigor-
ously test the reliability of publicly available data for
epidemiological purposes and, although the assessment
of clinical severity may be limited, it shows the assess-
ment of transmissibility and geographical dispersion to
be reliable. Our results concur with a recent study of
information on confirmed cases reported to the World
Health Organization in the 2009 influenza pandemic,
which also identified difficulties in estimating severity
from such datasets [20,21].
The volume of online information about an epidemic
is mostly driven by public interests and concern [22]. For
an epidemic of a newly emerging or re-emerging disease,
spread and severity of the diseases are of major public
concern and, hence, information on case counts, severe or
death cases are usually reported in more detail, especially
when they are associated with a new location. In our study
we also found that death dates were more frequently and
accurately reported than discharge dates [see Additional
file 3: Figure S2]. Information saturation also came into
effect as the epidemic progressed [9], which may have
resulted in decreasing accuracy and completeness of
some variables. This is similar to the second wave of the
influenza A(H1N1) pandemic during which there was
disproportionately less media coverage even with a higher
number of hospitalizations and deaths in some locations
compared to the first wave [23].In this study we did not attempt to estimate the incu-
bation period, a potentially important epidemiological
parameter for the control of disease transmission and
for models of disease spread. The Virginia Tech line lists
did collect information on occupational exposure, but
more detailed individual information on poultry exposure
was only available in the official line list. There was only
limited information on poultry exposure for more severe
cases in online news reports. Greater and more consistent
details on the exposure history of individual cases, such as
mode and different times of contact, are needed to allow
robust analyses on the incubation period [4]. However, in
a separate modeling study of the impact of live poultry
market closures, we were able to obtain a reasonable
estimate of the incubation period for A(H7N9) [15],
and similar inference could be possible based on the
publicly-available line lists.
There are several limitations in this study. The human
influenza A(H7N9) epidemic in 2013 was mostly confined
to the eastern part of China. Public data is likely to be less
consistent, in terms of timeliness and accuracy, for dis-
eases spreading across countries with different levels of
healthcare resources, culture or local political environ-
ments. Secondly, duplicate reporting from different data
sources may have inconsistent epidemiological informa-
tion. National or international health organizations were
regarded as most reliable but there were no well-defined
rules for resolving inconsistencies. Thirdly, since current
evidence shows that avian-to-human is the major trans-
mission mode for influenza A(H7N9) [15,24], our analyses
may not be directly generalizable to diseases with human-
to-human transmission, especially those with such rela-
tively high transmissibility that the scale may overwhelm
official health authorities as in the A(H1N1) pandemic in
2009 to 2010. Monitoring the evolving transmissibility of
emerging influenza viruses is crucial, but requires fairly
accurate information about the onset of symptoms of the
cases in addition to reliable exposure history information,
and the understanding of the transmission dynamics
among poultry and from poultry to humans. For the line
lists using publicly available data this information is very
limited, thus hindering quantification of transmissibility
in terms of the basic reproduction number. Finally,
there are diverse purposes for compiling different line
lists. For example, the main purpose of HealthMap is to
generate early outbreak notifications and map disease
occurrences. Hence, by design that line list placed less
emphasis on health status after hospitalization. The goal
and methods of data collection can influence their ultim-
ate utility.
For the specific purpose of epidemiological inference,
only a minimal dataset with standardized format and def-
inition [25], along with regular follow-up of patient status,
may improve data accuracy, completeness and timeliness
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avoid a too demanding requirement on data completeness
at the expense of sustainability or accuracy, and help in
reaching a consensus on the amount of details to be
disclosed while maintaining appropriate patient confi-
dentiality even in a public health emergency. For the
MERS epidemic, the national health authorities of the
affected countries have released information at different
times and sometimes with very limited resolution [26,27],
which would lead to challenges for any epidemiologist to
unify all of the information into a single consistent
database. In future emerging infectious disease outbreaks,
depositing a line list into a database with agreed fields and
hosted by a public platform, similar to the GISAID ap-
proach, and attaching corresponding time stamps and
sources to each updated variable may also avoid confusion
and improve accuracy.
Conclusions
In conclusion, we have reported types of epidemiological
inferences that can be reliably drawn from public informa-
tion, and major limitations for assessment of clinical se-
verity of the disease. As for the ongoing MERS epidemic
and the return of influenza A(H7N9) in winter 2013 to
2014 (more than 200 new cases have been confirmed since
October 2013) [28], a well-constructed line list will foster
joint efforts for more timely analyses with broader perspec-
tives. Our findings illustrate the increasing potential value
of digital epidemiology or infoepidemiology, based on novel
sources of information, such as social media, microblogs
and mobile phone applications [9,29]. If publicly available
information is sufficient to allow assessment of trans-
missibility and severity of emerging or reemerging infec-
tions [21,30], it may even be possible to crowdsource
the analytical processes and obtain essential inferences
more rapidly [31].
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Additional file 1: Data file. HealthMap, Virginia Tech, Bloomberg,
HKUSPH, and FluTrackers line lists for dates where updates or historical
archives were available, 5 April to 31, 2013.
Additional file 2: Table S1. Sources of publicly available information
for each line list. Table S2. Days required since 10 Apr to obtain robust
estimates from different line lists, defined by coefficients of variation <30%
comparing to the most updated estimates from the China CDC line list.
Additional file 3: Figure S1. Proportion of A(H7N9) cases from the five
line lists successfully matched to the official China CDC line list, 10 April
to 31 May 2013. Cases were matched by age, sex, province and onset
dates using more exact criteria in the first round of matching, followed
by a second round of matching allowing for larger discrepancy and
missing values. Figure S2. Proportion of missing demographic and
epidemiological variables for A(H7N9) cases from the five line lists, 10
April to 31 May 2013. The denominators of missing hospitalization,
death and discharge dates were the number of hospitalized, died and
discharged patients matched to the official line list. Figure S3. Accuracy
of demographic and epidemiological variables for Influenza A(H7N9)cases from the five line lists matched to the official line list, 10 April to 31
May 2013. Accuracy was defined to be exact for age, sex, province and
severe cases. A two day discrepancy was allowed for onset,
hospitalization, death and discharge dates. Figure S4. Epidemic curve by
date of illness onset at four different dates of analysis from the five line
lists, 15 February to 1 May 2013, overlaid with the epidemic curve based
on the China CDC line list (black). Figure S5. Onset-to-hospitalization
distribution, onset-to-death distribution and onset-to-discharge distribution
estimated from data available on 10, 17, 24 April and 1, 2 May 2013. Darker
colors represent estimates based on more recent data. Figure S6. Age, sex
distributions and number of A(H7N9) cases in Shanghai, Zhejiang and
Jiangsu, proportion of hospitalized and discharge cases from the five line
lists, 10 April to 31 May 2013. The open dots show the median value.
Rectangles show the lower and upper quartiles and vertical lines show the
5th to 95th percentiles.
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